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This article addresses contentious questions concerning individual freedom 
and democratic citizenship education in the contemporary circumstances of 
multiculturalism. It suggests that educating children for civic equality is an 
ambitious aim for any democracy and not one that can ever be realized once 
and for all. It provides evidence that multicultural conditions can challenge 
the very aim of educating children for civic equality. It explains that 
democracies are variously multicultural and the varieties of groups make a 
difference in the kind of education and the progress toward civic equality that 
can realistically be expected at any time. 
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I. Introduction 
In the epilogue to Democratic Education, I outline a democratic approach to 
multicultural education and illustrate some of its practical implications for 
schooling in the United States.2 
 The approach is broadly applicable because it is informed by a democratic 
ideal of civic equality: individuals should be treated and treat one another as 
equal citizens, regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, race, or religion. 
More or less civic equality distinguishes more from less democratic societies. 
Democratic education—publicly supported education that is defensible according 
to a democratic ideal—should educate children so that they are capable of assuming 
the rights and correlative responsibilities of equal citizenship, which include 
respecting other people's equal rights. In short, democratic education should both 
express and develop the capacity of all children to become equal citizens. 
Multicultural education in democracies can help further civic equality in two 
importantly different ways: first, by expressing the democratic value of tolerating 
cultural differences that are consistent with civic equality; and second, by 
recognizing the role that cultural differences have played in shaping society and the 
world in which children live. Not all education that goes by the name 
“multicultural” serves the ideal of civic equality in one of these two ways, but 
democratic multicultural education can (and I argue should) do so. Toleration and 
recognition of cultural differences, I argue, are both desirable parts of multicultural 
education. 
If toleration and recognition of cultural differences are both democratically 
desirable, then the stark contrast often drawn between a liberal politics of toleration 
and a nonliberal politics of recognition represents a false dichotomy. Liberal 
democracies can defend a set of multicultural educational practices that exhibit 
both toleration and recognition of cultural differences, depending on their content 
and social context. 
To defend a politics of toleration and recognition, we must differentiate among 
cultural practices, since not all cultural practices deserve to be tolerated, let alone 
recognized as parts of a democratic culture. In a democracy, a defensible standard 
of differentiation by publicly supported schools emerges from asking whether the 
                                                          
2. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education .Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
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practices are consistent with educating children for equal citizenship. As a general 
rule, democratic education should tolerate or recognize the teaching of cultural 
differences that aid, or at least do not impede, the education of children as civic 
equals. Democratic education defends the many kinds of multicultural education 
that are consistent with the aim of expressing the civic equality of citizens and 
educating children for civic equality. In a democracy, citizens are empowered to 
disagree about what educational practices are defensible on democratic grounds, 
and consequently to deliberate over their disagreements. Deliberative 
disagreement among a diverse citizenry is an important part of the ongoing public 
education of multicultural democracies.  
In this chapter, I examine how well civic equality, toleration, and recognition 
travel in multicultural democracies, and what their implications are for different 
forms of diversity. If multicultural democratic education is now a movement 
worldwide, and if it is defined by widely shared democratic aims, it also faces a 
tremendous variety of cultural, socioeconomic, and political conditions even within 
democracies. In many parts of the world, such as Western Europe, multicultural 
education programs have developed largely to accommodate relatively recent 
(post‐World War II) immigrant populations. In countries such as Belgium, Canada, 
the Netherlands, and South Africa, the debate over multicultural education 
revolves as much around the demands of more settled ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic minority groups, each of whom claims authority over its “own” children's 
education. In the United States with regard to Native Americans, and in Canada 
with regard to the Inuit and other “First Peoples,” as in many other countries, 
multicultural education is also concerned with the needs of indigenous populations 
that have been oppressed and marginalized by the larger country in which they 
exist. In still other situations in some of the same countries—the United States is a 
particularly conspicuous case because of its legacy of slavery—historically 
oppressed, nonnative minorities make special claims in the name of 
multiculturalism on an educational system. 
These examples and myriad others indicate that minority populations that 
make claims on multicultural education are enormously varied. They are varied in 
more complex ways than is generally recognized. Some theorists have argued that 
indigenous groups have claims to a politics of recognition while immigrant groups 
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do not. Immigrant groups, they argue, come to a country voluntarily and therefore 
can be expected to give up more of their native culture while indigenous groups 
were forced to integrate when they should have been permitted to perpetuate their 
culture. The problem with this argument is that it grossly simplifies, to the point of 
distorting, the condition of many immigrant as well as indigenous populations. 
Many immigrants were forced to escape their native countries and had little if any 
choice as to where to go. We cannot justifiably treat immigration either today or in 
the past as a purely voluntary phenomenon. Nor can we assume that the 
descendants of immigrants or indigenous populations face the same conditions as 
their ancestors. Some turn out to be better and others worse off than their ancestors 
with regard to the relevant democratic standard of civic equality. 
Depending on their socioeconomic situation, members of immigrant and 
indigenous groups may be treated more or less as civic equals, and find themselves 
more or less free to remain in a country and cultivate the culture of their choice. If 
voluntary residence is the basis for a democracy's refusal to recognize a group's 
distinctive culture, then almost all groups have some legitimate claim to 
recognition, not only toleration. This is because citizenship is largely not a 
voluntary phenomenon. Voluntarism is not the primary dimension by which to 
judge claims of toleration and recognition. Civic equality is. If claims to toleration 
and recognition are assessed on grounds of civic equality, then among the most 
significant variations between groups will be their tolerance or intolerance of their 
dissenting members and other groups. A rule of thumb might be: a democracy 
should tolerate and recognize those cultures that are compatible with mutual 
toleration and respect within and across cultural groups. 
Even limiting ourselves to democratic societies for the sake of focus, we notice 
how varied cultural groups are with regard to their willingness and ability to live 
together in a context of mutual toleration and respect. The principle of civic equality 
is general enough to be applicable as a starting point for multicultural education to 
all democratic societies. Yet educators, who have practical aims, also need to be able 
to move from the general to the specific. Just as educational policies unsupported 
by democratic principles remain arbitrary and unjustified to the people who are 
bound by them, general principles unlinked to educational policies and practices 
remain practically impotent and pragmatically untested. Any theory of democratic 
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multicultural education, therefore, should be both principled and adaptable to 
variations among groups and contexts. It needs to probe the implications of diverse 
cultures and conditions for its own commitment to educating children for civic 
equality and for the freedom to choose their way of life. 
1. Aiming for Civic Equality 
The fundamental commitment of a democratic approach to publicly funded 
education (which I call democratic education, for short) is as follows: All 
children—regardless of their cultural background, ethnicity, race, gender, or 
religion—are entitled to an education adequate to equal citizenship. The issue 
that immediately arises within democratic education is that citizens often 
reasonably disagree about what constitutes an education adequate to equal 
citizenship. 
Deliberative democracy can make a virtue out of the necessity of such 
disagreement. The virtue is that democracies that respect reasonable disagreement 
can creatively combine unity and diversity in democratic education. Effective 
education is locally delivered, although oversight mechanisms range from the local 
to the national and even international. Diverse communities can institute many 
variations on the common theme of educating children for equal citizenship. 
Creative tensions—multicultural variations on the theme of democratic 
education—all accept civic equality as an aim, but elaborate in innumerable ways 
not only on the means to more civic equality but also on the other valuable ends of 
education. Civic equality is a general aim of education that leaves room for 
democratic education to defend a great deal of diversity. 
Not all disagreements in democratic societies, however, produce creative 
tensions in democratic education. Destructive tensions occur when dominant 
members of the government or opposition groups subordinate the very aim of 
educating children as civic equals to perpetuate their own power. In such instances, 
group power or culture is confused with the legitimate authority to educate. 
Children are then implicitly treated as the mere vehicles to transmit power or 
culture from one generation to the next. Educators then assume a position of 
absolute authority over the education of their “own” children. This practice 
impedes the civic equality of these children as well as their ability to develop the 
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tools to choose their life. Whereas creative tensions propel changes in how 
democratic multicultural education is conceived and designed out of a shared aim 
of better educating children for both civic equality and the ability to choose one's 
life, destructive tensions challenge these very aims. 
Although destructive tensions threaten democratic education, toleration 
permits the profession of certain destructive positions. The democratic hope is for 
more creative and fewer destructive challenges. Civic equality calls for an education 
that empowers adults as equal citizens, and that empowerment entails (among 
other things) the freedom to disagree about the demands of democratic education. 
All we can say here is that it is a reasonable democratic hope that disagreement 
within the bounds of equal toleration and recognition will be on balance creative. 
The diverse kinds of multicultural groups further highlight creative and 
destructive challenges to educating children for civic equality in multicultural 
democracies. Toleration and recognition of diversity should be structured as 
unifying practices when they aim at educating all children for civic equality. Not all 
multicultural practices, however, share this aim. How can democrats differentiate 
between multicultural practices that do and do not educate children for (more or 
less) civic equality? To answer this question, I draw primarily on the United States 
for examples because it has experienced large and recurrent cycles of immigration, 
has substantial indigenous communities, has a large linguistic minority, and also 
contains major groups of historically oppressed citizens. All of these features make 
it useful in developing a principled yet context‐sensitive approach to multicultural 
education. That said, I also draw on other national contexts, and welcome scholars 
who focus on other countries to add both critically and constructively to this 
project. 
Whatever examples we draw upon, two separate questions need to be asked: 
• How can democratic education strive for civic equality under conditions 
of diversity? 
• Do some multicultural conditions successfully challenge the 
democratic framework itself, and suggest the need for a guiding 
principle other than civic equality in some contexts? 
Before considering these questions, I should clarify the terms multicultural 
education, toleration, and recognition. 
23   The Journal of Ethical Reflections, 1 (4), Winter 2020-2021 
 
 
2. Multicultural Education: Toleration and Recognition 
To consider what kinds of multicultural education are defensible, we need to use 
the term multicultural in a way that is not polemical or question‐begging. 
Anything multicultural is sometimes said to rely on a belief in moral relativism. 
Tying multicultural education to moral relativism indefensibly narrows the use 
of the term and thereby prejudges multicultural education in many people's 
minds (both for and against). Multicultural, as I use it here, refers to a state of 
schooling, society, or the world that contains many cultures that affect one 
another by virtue of the interactions of people who identify with or rely upon 
these cultures. A culture consists of patterns of thinking, speaking, and acting 
that are associated with a human community larger than a few families.  
Multicultural schools and societies are by no means new. As interdependence, 
communication, and commerce have expanded, most societies and the world have 
become increasingly multicultural. Individuals themselves are multicultural; they 
rely upon many cultures, not only one, in living their lives. Individuals are also more 
than the sum of their cultural identities; they are creative agents who use many 
cultural resources to live lives that are not simply the product of external cultural 
forces. Individual identities can therefore express diverse, inter dynamic cultures 
and they can also express their own creative way of interpreting those cultures. 
To force anyone to choose between being multicultural and being a free agent 
is therefore a false forced choice. We must not assume that any individual is 
completely constituted by a combination of cultural identities. People can creatively 
constitute their identities, but they cannot do so de novo. People are born within 
complex social contexts, and they become human agents by interacting with other 
people within culturally loaded contexts. Human creativity and choice operate 
against a background of interactive and dynamic cultural resources. Cultures offer 
contexts of choice,3 but since human beings are creative multicultural agents, they 
can reinterpret the various contexts of choice in which they live. 
A standard debate over how best to respond to diverse cultural resources and 
                                                          
3. “Familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable. Sharing in a culture, being part of it, 
determines the limits of the feasible.” Joseph Raz and Avishai Margalit, “National Self‐Determination,” in 
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, by Joseph Raz (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p. 119. 
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identities within a single democracy often poses a stark choice between two options. 
The first is privatizing differences in order to realize a public realm unified around 
principles—such as equal liberty and opportunity—that are often (misleadingly) 
called culturally neutral principles. The second option is publicly recognizing 
differences and thereby dividing the public realm into equally valuable but 
separatist cultural group identities. The two options offer very different 
understandings of the nature of citizenship and mutual respect among individuals 
who identify with various cultural groups. Either citizens should tolerate their 
cultural differences by privatizing them and acting in public as if cultural 
differences do not exist, or they should respect their cultural differences by publicly 
recognizing them and treating all as equally valuable but separate group identities. 
The first response to multiculturalism is often identified as supporting liberal 
values, which are considered culturally neutral, and the second response as 
opposing them and substituting culturally specific values for culturally neutral 
ones. This opposition between toleration and recognition, as I argue in Democratic 
Education, is misleading. Also misleading is the contrast between culturally 
specific and culturally neutral values. No values are culturally neutral in the sense 
of being equally conducive or acceptable to all cultures. Yet some values can be 
defended from the vantage point of many—even if not all— cultures that are 
common in and across democracies. The latter phenomenon—which might be 
called cross‐cultural principles—should not be confused with culturally neutral 
principles. Toleration and recognition, moreover, are not diametrically opposed. 
In their most democratically defensible forms, toleration and recognition of 
cultural diversity are compatible. 
Toleration at its best implies that individuals be given the right to practice their 
cultural differences in private, but it does not require citizens or states to treat 
individuals as if their cultural differences were irrelevant to their public standing.4 
Recognition at its best implies respect for various cultural differences—for example, 
by integrating the cultural contributions of diverse groups into the history 
curriculum—but recognition does not entail treating all cultural practices or 
                                                          
4. See Susan Mendus. Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism. London: Macmillan, 1989. 
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contributions to history as equally valuable.5 Taken at their best, toleration and 
public recognition are compatible in both theory and practice. 
Of course, some practices that are defended on grounds of toleration or 
recognition may be indefensible. Tolerating or recognizing the equal value of a 
cultural practice such as female genital mutilation when it is a form of torture 
practiced on young girls is not what toleration or recognition justifiably calls for. A 
democratic educational system has a responsibility to recognize racist and other 
discriminating ideologies for what they are, and not treat them as having positive 
public value in the school curriculum or elsewhere in public life just because some 
people value them. To be even minimally decent, a democracy cannot tolerate every 
practice that every cultural group, subgroup, or individual deems desirable on 
cultural grounds. Democracies need to ask whether cultural practices respect the 
civic equality of individuals. Civic equality should serve as the guiding principle for 
applying both toleration and recognition in multicultural contexts. 
Democratic education should recognize important cultural contributions of 
different groups. Democracies also should tolerate diverse cultural practices that 
may offend some people's sensibilities but that do not violate anyone's rights to 
civic equality. Toleration and public recognition of cultural differences are, 
therefore, two different responses to two different sets of issues that arise partly out 
of cultural differences. 
In its educational system, a democracy should not only tolerate cultural 
differences that are consistent with educating children for civic equality but should 
also recognize the cultural contributions of different groups. Why? Because such 
recognition helps express the civic equality of (and respect for) members of different 
cultural groups. A democracy that aims to educate children for civic equality, 
therefore, must not be opposed to publicly recognizing cultural differences, as any 
good multicultural curriculum reflects, yet it must be opposed to ceding rights to 
cultural groups to engage in practices that oppress individuals (whether insiders or 
outsiders to the group) in the name of recognizing cultural difference. 
A defensible response of democratic education to multicultural diversity, 
                                                          
5. See Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25–74. 
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therefore, incorporates both toleration and recognition. It rejects the dichotomy 
“privatize and tolerate or publicly recognize” when it comes to terms with the 
fundamental phenomenon of a world in which all societies and individual identities 
are increasingly multicultural. What sorts of steps should educational systems take 
both to recognize and to tolerate multicultural diversity? I will outline the 
approaches of recognition and toleration, both of which are important to any 
successful multicultural education initiative, but each of which has a special role 
and therefore independent ethical relevance. 
3. Public Recognition through Curricular Design 
 “Old” minority groups, including indigenous groups and historically 
oppressed groups like African Americans, have special claims on the shape of 
national educational curricula. For them, the principle of recognition has a 
historical dimension: it requires that the wrongs they suffered as well as the 
goods they contributed to society be acknowledged alongside those of the 
majority groups. The implications are enormous for democratic education, 
since most of the curriculum, as well as the culture of the school more 
generally, needs to be alert to the demands of multicultural recognition. 
To teach U.S. history, for instance, largely without reference to the experiences, 
including the oppressions and the contributions of Native Americans, African 
Americans, Latino Americans, and Asian Americans, constitutes a compound 
failure. The failure is intellectual: that of not recognizing the historical role of 
many different cultures, the contributions along with the oppressions of 
individuals who identify with those cultures. But the failure is more than 
intellectual; it is also a moral failure judged by democratic principles. It morally 
damages democracy—and expresses a lack of respect for individuals by virtue of 
their group identity—to convey a false impression that their ancestors have not 
suffered wrongs or contributed goods in making society what it is today. 
Why do historical wrongs inflicted on members of minority groups need to be 
recognized alongside their contributions? Again, the reasons are both intellectual 
and ethical. Learning the history of the oppression of slaves, for example, in the 
United States is crucial to understanding the past and analyzing contemporary 
social realities. Assessing the past and present also depends on coming to terms 
with oppression. Democratic ethics cannot do without a citizenry that is capable of 
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being critical of its past partly (but not only) in order to construct a better future. 
Something analogous can be said about the value of including women's voices in 
the curriculum for both intellectual and ethical reasons, which are closely connected. 
Like other oppressed groups, and partly owing to their oppression, women have 
some distinct experiences and sensibilities that call for recognition. When textbooks 
excluded women's voices and experiences, they conveyed the false impression that 
women have contributed little or nothing to the cultural resources that should be 
accessible to everyone in a democratic society. Conveying this impression is also an 
ethical wrong: it imposes an extra burden on members of oppressed groups, making 
it more difficult for them to be empowered to share as civic equals in shaping their 
society. Negative stereotyping of women and minority groups is exacerbated by their 
absence from, or negative stereotyping within, school curricula and educational 
practices more generally. Men as well as women develop falsely unequal impressions 
of their civic worth, public standing, and social entitlements. 
Even apart from any probable effects, excluding the contributions of different 
cultures constitutes a moral failing in its own right. Exclusion represents a failure 
to respect those individuals as equal citizens who identify with less dominant 
cultures. The most basic premise of democratic education—respect for all 
individuals as civic equals—calls for a history that recognizes both the oppressions 
and the social contributions of individuals. 
To overlook the ways in which minorities have been oppressed by, or 
contributed to, society is to disrespect not only those cultures but, more 
fundamentally, also the individuals who identify with the cultures. Democracy 
owes equal respect to individuals as civic equals, not to groups, but disrespecting 
some groups conveys disrespect to the individuals who identify with those groups. 
Equal respect can be manifest in various parts of a school curriculum. 
Literature can no longer be taught as a field that belongs exclusively, or even largely, 
to “dead white males.” Toni Morrison takes her place beside the greatest male 
novelists, as the literary voice of an African‐American woman, but not only as that. 
Morrison is also a great literary voice who can be appreciated across many cultures. 
Such cross‐cultural appreciation is another contribution of multicultural 
recognition and a manifestation of equal respect for individuals, whether they are 
women or men, this color, ethnicity, religion, or that. Equal respect entails the 
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inclusion of books such as Beloved in school curricula that represent the oppression 
of groups in literary as well as historical form. 
Multicultural aims for the curriculum legitimately extend beyond history and 
literature. Some schools, for example, make it a point of teaching math in a 
multicultural way by representing different cultures in the word problems assigned 
to students. Traditional math can be well taught in ways that capture the cultural 
imaginations of students.6 Nothing is lost and something valuable is gained in the 
process. Schools can sensitively introduce students to different cultures by 
recognizing how different groups celebrate the New Year, and by analyzing both 
the similarities and differences in holiday celebrations. 
Once again, the intellectual and the ethical can mutually reinforce one another, 
as they should, in democratic education without infringing on anyone's legitimate 
freedom.7 
Democratic education supports a “politics of recognition” based on respect for 
individuals and their equal rights as citizens, not on deference to tradition, 
proportional representation of groups, or the survival rights of cultures.8 The practice 
of history textbook publishing in the United States has often perverted this politics 
of recognition. Succumbing to strong market and political pressures, publishers 
sometimes produce history textbooks that include only positive references to 
traditional American heroes and only enough references to people of politically 
prominent ethnicities to achieve proportional representation. These practices are 
counterproductive to engaging students in learning about the history and politics of 
                                                          
6. See some examples at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20101017014420/http://mathforum.org/alejandre/mathfair/index.html. 




8. Compare the perspective of Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and “The 
Politics of Recognition” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 25–37. Taylor claims that cultural 
communities are entitled to survival, protected by the state, as long as the cultures respect basic individual 
rights. (Taylor does not consider cases where so few people want the culture to survive that it would take a 
heroic effort on the part of the state, even against its own citizens' reasonable democratic will, to secure its 
survival.) 
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their society, an engagement that is essential to teaching the skills and virtues of 
democratic citizenship and respecting every individual as an equal citizen. 
Practices like these are not the inevitable product of a democratic process. 
Democratic processes can be, and in some states actually are, more deliberative and 
more conducive to developing the deliberative skills of democratic citizenship. 
Several states, Tennessee and Virginia among them, along with various inner‐city 
public schools and elite private schools, have demonstrated this. They were 
sufficiently impressed to adopt a textbook that can serve as a model for deliberative 
democratic education. A History of US by Joy Hakim presents American history as 
a series of narratives that are inclusive and accurate.9 With an engaging and 
broadly accessible style, its content is relatively complex. 
Equally important, the narratives highlight the relevance to democratic 
citizenship of choices that individuals and organized groups make in politics. 
When texts and teachers present narratives of ethical choices in politics, they 
set the stage for students to think about those choices as democratic citizens. A 
multicultural history should not imply—let alone claim—that vastly different beliefs 
and practices are equally valuable. Diverse beliefs and practices are subjects of 
understanding and evaluation. Appreciating the importance of a multicultural 
curriculum is only the prologue to teaching skills of understanding and evaluation. 
The value of any belief or practice cannot simply be assumed; it must be assessed. 
Appreciation, understanding, and evaluation are three capacities of democratic 
citizenship that multicultural education can cultivate. Classrooms that include 
students from diverse cultural backgrounds can facilitate such cultivation, 
especially if teachers engage their students in deliberating about their 
commonalities and differences. Teachers who are attuned to the desirability of 
deliberation in multicultural classrooms, and find ways of making such 
deliberation productive of appreciation, understanding, and evaluation of 
commonalities and differences, are models of democratic educators. This is 
because open‐minded learning in a multicultural setting—to which students bring 
diverse presuppositions and convictions—is a prelude to democratic deliberation 
                                                          
9. See a discussion of this book in comparison to other trends in teaching history in the essay by Alexander 
Stille, “The Betrayal of History,” The New York Review of Books, June 11, 1998, pp. 15–20. 
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in a multicultural society and world. Democratic deliberation, and the open‐
minded teaching that anticipates it, encourages all citizens to appreciate, 
understand, and assess differences that are matters of mutual concern. 
4. Tolerating Diversity without Endorsing Every Difference 
Not all matters that are important to us as individuals are—or should be—of 
mutual concern for citizens in a democracy. Democratic education calls for public 
recognition when its absence would be discriminatory or disrespectful—as in the 
case of textbooks that exclude the contributions and experiences of oppressed 
minorities or women. Some cultural practices, such as whether or how 
individuals worship, should not be matters of mutual concern among citizens. 
For people to be free to live their own lives, some of their cultural practices 
must also be free from public regulation and even scrutiny. Multicultural 
education, therefore, should not suggest that every cultural difference needs 
to be a matter of mutual concern. 
To the extent that there is a mutual concern about religious worship, for 
example, it is directed not at appreciating, understanding, and assessing competing 
cultural practices but at tolerating them. The mutual concern is that citizens 
tolerate religious differences that do not harm others, not that they endorse or 
otherwise assess or mutually justify those differences by a common ethical 
standard. To put the same point somewhat differently, toleration of diverse ways of 
worshiping is what is mutually justifiable in a deliberative democracy, not the 
diverse ways of worshiping themselves. A multicultural world includes a wide range 
of conceptions of the good life, none of which needs to be mutually justifiable to all 
citizens. Why? In a decent democracy, the state does not dictate or regulate belief. 
(If the manifestation of belief directly harms others—for example, by leading people 
to sacrifice others for the sake of salvation—then coercion may be justified but only 
when aimed at protecting the equal liberty of others.) For many people, religious 
belief constitutes some of their deepest ethical commitments. To coerce or regulate 
such commitments is to not respect the persons who hold them. In addition, the 
state has no expertise in deciding the “right” way to worship. It, therefore, should 
leave such decisions to individuals to decide according to their own deepest 
convictions. Freedom of worship, therefore, can be considered a basic right of 
democratic citizenship and honored as such in democratic education. 
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A democratic state takes toleration seriously to the extent that it does not 
impose ways of worshiping and the like on students in publicly subsidized 
schools. It, therefore, does not publicly recognize one way or the other of 
worshiping as proper or improper in its own right. It leaves citizens free to 
worship as they choose provided that they respect the equal liberty of others. 
Worship is then “privatized” only in the very specific sense that it is not a matter 
of state endorsement or recognition of its “rightness.” Worship still can be a 
public matter in the broad sense of being an overtly social activity, which is 
publicly protected by law. 
Hard questions arise in multicultural education with regard to religious 
freedom—for example, when individuals or groups want to manifest their 
religiosity in various ways within public schools. Should a democratic state tolerate 
manifestations of religion within public schools? Religious toleration is extremely 
important to the just treatment of all minorities who diverge from the dominant 
ways of worship. But religious toleration becomes especially salient in the way in 
which a democratic government treats recent immigrant populations with 
unfamiliar ways of manifesting their religiosity. These groups typically do not 
demand a separate school system or public recognition (in the sense of 
endorsement) of their particular religions. What they typically do demand is 
toleration based on an equitable rather than an unfairly skewed interpretation of 
the toleration principle. The demand for a fair application of democratic principles 
applies to decisions as basic as who will be educated and how. Recent French 
history offers a paradigmatic example of public conflict over what constitutes a fair 
interpretation of the principle of toleration. 
The “affair of the scarf” began in France when three Muslim girls attended their 
public high school in Creil, France, wearing hijab or chador—head coverings that are 
demanded by some interpretations of orthodox Islam. French public schools are, by 
law and centuries‐long tradition, secular. A 1937 law prohibits the wearing of 
religious symbols in government‐run schools, but yarmulkes and crucifixes have 
been permitted on grounds that they are “inconspicuous” religious symbols.10 Not 
surprisingly, given its greater unfamiliarity to mainstream French culture, the hijab 
was considered “conspicuous.” The principal in Creil insisted that the three girls 
                                                          
10. New York Times, November 12, 1989, p. 5, and December 3, 1989, p. 17. 
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remove their hijab or be expelled from class. When they refused and were expelled 
from class, the controversy became national, and soon international, by its audience. 
Some democrats defend expulsion because religious garb that symbolizes civic 
inequality—not least the inequality of women—must be excluded from public 
schools. A democracy is responsible for publicly educating children to become civic 
equals, and one way of doing so is to keep all differentiating dress that symbolizes 
civic inequality out of public schools. Other democrats respond by denying that the 
hijab must be interpreted in a way that blocks educating Muslim girls for civic 
equality, which after all is the aim of democratic education. These democrats 
oppose expelling children for wearing religious symbols when they are otherwise 
willing to be publicly educated as civic equals. They find the expulsion wrong in 
principle and counterproductive in practice to democratic ends.11 In an equal but 
opposite response to those who defend the expulsion, these democrats agree that a 
democracy is responsible for publicly educating children to become civic equals 
despite their religious differences, but they argue that religious toleration within 
public schools is a principled means toward this important end. 
A democratic rationale for tolerating religious differences, as this example 
suggests, is to help citizens understand that many disagreements in public life are 
compatible with sharing a society as civic equals. It is important to note that this 
rationale is not well captured by the notion of privatization. To tolerate the wearing 
of yarmulkes, crucifixes, and hijab in public schools would be neither to privatize 
these religious symbols nor to publicly endorse them. Rather, it would be to 
demonstrate that religious differences can be accommodated within public schools 
as long as they do not block the aim of educating children as civic equals. The 
controversy over the hijab can then be viewed as one of democratic disagreement: 
agreement on the end of civic equality but disagreement on the justifiable and 
practical means of achieving the end. 
A question that called for democratic deliberation was the following: Would the 
willingness or the refusal of the French public school system to tolerate the hijab be 
more conducive to educating Muslim girls for civic equality? If educators and 
citizens alike publicly ask this question, then they can publicly deliberate over their 
                                                          
11. For a variety of views, see Susan Moller Okin and respondents, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ed. 
Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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disagreements, and their answers—even if divergent, as answers often are in a 
democracy that protects free speech—will be guided by a manifestly shared 
commitment to educating for civic equality. What policy within the range of options 
available to French society is more likely to aid in educating Muslim girls for civic 
equality? This question is very different from the racist response of those who 
argued for the immediate expulsion of all Muslim immigrants from France and the 
closing of the borders to people who do not share a French pedigree. 
Multicultural education can demonstrate that symbols have different meanings 
to different people in different contexts. A hijab does not need to be viewed as a 
symbol of gender inequality, even if it is now widely viewed as such.12 The meaning 
of symbols varies and changes over time and in cultural contexts. Recognizing 
various symbolic interpretations as reasonable is a prelude to considering how a 
system of public schooling can best aid in educating children of different religious 
and cultural backgrounds for greater civic equality. 
Some critics disparagingly call toleration of this sort “funny‐hat liberalism.”13 
They argue that it is little more than a pretense for accommodating ways of life that 
dissent from liberal orthodoxy. The price paid by orthodox Muslim parents for 
agreeing to educate their girls on tolerant terms may be a dilution of an orthodox 
religious way of life. Even if this is the case, it does not damage the position of 
democratic education. Democratic education does not aim to preserve or even to 
be equally conducive to all ways of life. Were the hijab accommodated in French 
public schools in the spirit of democratic education, the schools would do so for the 
sake of educating all children as equal citizens with diverse religious views and 
practices, not for the sake of perpetuating orthodox Islam (or any other secular or 
religious way of life). 
Toleration in the service of civic equality cannot claim to support cultural or 
religious ways of life on their own terms, since not all cultural or religious 
                                                          
12. For an Islamic perspective on headscarves, and on “the affair of the scarf,” see Aziza Y. al‐Hibri, “Is 
Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women? ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), pp. 41–46. 
13. For a critique conveyed by this term and a discussion of the hijab case, see Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, 
“Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration,” Political Theory 21 (November 1993), pp. 585–605. 
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perspectives embrace toleration. Toleration is not culturally neutral, and saying so 
is not a critique of toleration. A culture itself does not have a right to equal support 
by a democratic government just because it is a culture. Democratic governments 
owe children equal rights to be educated for civic equality (and as civic equals). If 
some cultural perspectives would deny children this right, democratic education 
will find itself at odds with parts of these cultures. But democratic education need 
not, therefore, be at odds with all of any culture. It is the responsibility of publicly 
supported schools to educate all students as civic equals. By asking how best to 
educate the Muslim girls for civic equality, democrats challenge themselves to 
apply the principle of toleration in an equitable manner, which does not 
unnecessarily exclude some children because their religious symbols are more 
conspicuous or controversial in their meaning than others. 
Conditions like those that gave rise to the “affair of the scarf” have led many 
critics of multicultural education to ask whether public school systems can 
successfully strive for civic equality under conditions of cultural diversity. The 
analysis above suggests that a lot depends on the nature of the diversity and the 
democratic response. The challenge of combining religious toleration with an 
education for civic equality is greater, for example, the less willing orthodox 
religious parents are to educate girls equally with boys to prepare them for public 
life and the professions. 
The analysis above also suggests that the challenge of multiculturalism to 
democratic education depends far less on the extent to which the group is newly 
arrived or not in the society, or indigenous or immigrant, than on the extent to 
which its commitments and identity are compatible with civic equality. “Civic 
equality within what society?” is another question to ask of any government that 
restricts the cultural content of schooling to the dominant culture or cultures. I 
cannot pursue this question at length in this essay, but I can say, based on the 
analysis above, that toleration and recognition, taken together, leave room for great 
cultural variation in democratic education. Civic equality within any and all 
democracies is what democratic education supports. Any group that is willing and 
able to constitute itself as a democracy, and provide an education that aims at civic 
equality for students, has full ethical standing. Indigenous groups that constitute 
themselves democratically, therefore, can make strong claims for educating their 
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own children in their own culture and consistently for civic equality. To the extent 
that dominant groups fail to educate children for civic equality, their claims over 
other groups are without ethical standing. Unity without the aim of civic equality is 
an authoritarian, not a democratic, value. 
Democratic education, therefore, depends on a commitment to civic equality by 
diverse groups in diverse societies. A commitment to civic equality, in turn, 
depends in practice on interpreting toleration and recognition in fair ways so as to 
provide all children, whatever their ethnicity, religion, race, or gender, with the 
education that they deserve. Diversity per se does not make striving for civic 
equality difficult. A lack of commitment to civic equality and fair accommodation 
of diversity does. 
5. Challenges to the Aim of Civic Equality 
The largest normative question remains: Do some multicultural conditions 
successfully challenge the democratic framework itself, and suggest the need 
for a guiding principle other than civic equality? I have already suggested that 
the framework of democratic education is a kind of principled pragmatism (or 
what I have also called “pragmatic idealism”). It does not insist on realizing 
civic equality against all odds. Rather, it aims at civic equality and, therefore, 
judges to what extent (and how best) it can be realized in particular contexts, 
all of which are nonideal but some are far less ideal than others. 
Some democratic contexts may be so far from ideal for democratic education, 
however, as to challenge the very aim of civic equality itself. Consider, for example, 
a democracy where the dominant nationality is far more liberal and democratic 
toward its own than toward other subordinate and historically oppressed 
nationalities, who are themselves relatively illiberal and undemocratic. The United 
States vis‐à‐vis Native Americans and Israel relative to Palestinians are two 
complex and troubling examples for democratic education. The United States 
devolved educational (and other political) authority to the local level of Native 
American tribes, but it is far from clear that progress toward civic equality (internal 
to the tribes or between them and the larger society) has resulted. Nor is it clear 
what a better alternative might have been (or is today). 
In Israel's case, many people who otherwise disagree agree that two culturally 
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distinct nations—Israel and Palestine—are needed for minimum stability in the 
area. Moreover, the absence of ongoing violence is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
precondition for teaching children to tolerate rather than hate one another, and to 
recognize each nation's right to exist. Even with two nations, however, the 
challenge of educating children for civic equality will be formidable, since the 
nations will probably be radically unequal in liberty and opportunity, an issue that 
democratic education does not adequately address when it focuses only on 
education within the boundaries of a single nation. The education systems in these 
two possible neighboring states will also have to find ways to recognize and tolerate 
minority students from the other (formerly adversary) nationality. The Israeli‐
Palestinian example is important not only for what it can tell us about the 
preconditions of educating children for civic equality—some peaceful and 
minimally unified society is necessary. The example also alerts us to the larger 
challenge of educating children to respect members of other societies as human 
beings who are equally deserving of civic equality, but who are denied such 
standing because they were born or raised somewhere else. 
Many groups in many societies, including many democracies, do not accept the 
principle of civic equality. Indeed, many find the principle threatening to their 
valued way of life. What is the justifiable response of democratic education to such 
groups? We need to distinguish between the demands of insular groups who 
peacefully ask (almost) only to be left alone and those of separatist groups who 
typically insist, often violently, on far more. The Amish are a paradigmatic case of 
the former kind of (almost always agrarian) group, who ask for no welfare benefits, 
do not vote, and want above all to live a communal way of life free from the political 
authority of the larger democracy. They expect to be protected against violence, and 
they pose no threat of violence to the larger society. In this sense, the “social 
contract” that they request is quite reciprocal. 
Peaceful groups like the Amish pose a problem for democratic education only 
if and when (as is often the case) their educational system offers far less preparation 
for exercising one's freedom and opportunity—which was afforded some parents 
who insist on denying it to their children—than the education that would otherwise 
be offered by the larger society. Democratic principles are compromised if the 
group is permitted to educate their children as they see fit, with no constraints 
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whatsoever, but the compromise has far fewer ramifications for the larger 
democracy than a capitulation to the demands of a violent separatist group. 
Nonetheless, democracies do compromise an important principle of educating all 
children within their borders to the status of equal citizens when they decide to 
exempt some insular groups from this democratically justifiable requirement. 
When democracies do make such exemptions, they should recognize that they are 
effectively placing the value of a particular communal way of life above the value of 
a democratic education. 
The problem posed to democratic education by violent separatist groups is far 
greater to the extent that they threaten the unity of the society and are likely to teach 
their children intolerance and disrespect for their neighbors. Deferring to the 
demands of a group simply because it represents a different culture cannot be 
justified by democratic principles. Only pragmatic necessity can justify such 
deference on grounds that no better alternative is available. The goodness of 
alternatives must be measured by defensible democratic principles, not by the aims 
or claims of the violent separatist group. If possible, a legitimate democratic state 
facing an intolerant separatist movement should effectively defend its authority 
with the aim of guaranteeing greater civic equality to all than would be afforded by 
the separatist alternative. One important means of guaranteeing greater civic 
equality is offering all children a publicly subsidized education that promotes 
tolerance and mutual respect across many multicultural lines. 
Some historically oppressed groups are viewed as challenging the aim of 
teaching all children as civic equals when they actually further it. They distrust the 
authority of the democratic government that has treated them oppressively in the 
past. Rarely is oppression overcome once and for all, and the legacy of a long history 
of oppression must be taken seriously by any decent democracy. When historically 
oppressed minorities press claims on public education, they often do so in the name 
of civic equality. Some historical inequalities, especially those that have been 
compounded by decades of slavery, de jure and then de facto discrimination, create 
conditions under which equal treatment cannot constitute treatment as an equal. 
The claim that equal treatment is all that is needed may be a sincere 
interpretation of the ideal of an education for civic equality, but it is not an adequate 
interpretation. It is naïve to think that nothing more or different is needed to 
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educate African‐American children as civic equals than newly arrived Swedish‐
American immigrants.14 Neither toleration nor recognition of cultural 
contributions is likely to suffice to educate children who continue to be negatively 
and falsely stereotyped by large segments of society simply by virtue of the color of 
their skin. 
The situation of identity groups whose members continue to suffer from 
negative stereotyping and consequent discriminations calls not for an alternative 
to the aim of civic equality but, rather, for creative interpretations of what civic 
equality demands of educational practices and institutions, and what can be 
realized over time in particular contexts. The democratic defense of civic equality 
itself requires more ambitious efforts to attend to the needs of members of 
perennially disadvantaged groups. 
Conclusion 
Educating children for civic equality is an ambitious aim for any democracy, 
and not one that by its very nature can ever be realized once and for all. More 
rather than less civic equality is all that a democrat can realistically aim for 
over time. If more civic equality is better than less, then democrats have a 
guiding principle that can help us evaluate educational practices and 
institutions. Striving for civic equality in democracies under multicultural 
conditions is not an all‐or‐nothing end. It is a question of practical judgment 
as to what educational practices are more or less conducive to greater civic 
equality. 
The practical implications of civic equality, moreover, vary across groups. The 
claims to civic equality advanced by different groups cannot be treated identically 
because the content of their demands and their relationship to democratic ideals 
are far from identical. 
Some groups—indigenous groups and other minorities with a domestic history 
that extends back in time, for example—have legitimate claims to be recognized for 
                                                          
14. For data on contemporary discrimination and negative stereotyping of African Americans, see David O. 
Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo, eds., Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); and Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: 
Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
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contributions to the country's history. Some of these same groups, but not others, 
also are entitled to educational aid to overcome the injustice of accumulated 
disadvantage. What such justifiable demands share is the aim of educating 
children for civic equality. 
Although I have not had the time to catalog the full range of justifiable demands 
of cultural groups, it is worth noting that long‐term linguistic minorities may lay 
claim to special resources to help preserve their language and culture if they 
themselves are too poor to afford to do so on equal footing with other citizens. This 
is because civic equality does not permit a state to deprive its less affluent citizens, 
against their will, of the institutional structures on which their cultural and 
linguistic practices have come to rest. 
Some immigrant groups may require little more than toleration and well‐
trained teachers who know how to help children learn a new language and adjust 
to a strange and likely somewhat scary environment. Well‐trained teachers are 
often no small feat to find, especially when the profession of teaching is underpaid 
relative to others of similar social value. 
Relatively affluent and well‐educated immigrants pose less of a challenge than 
the more common situation of children from poor and uneducated immigrant 
families. The children of affluent immigrant parents may need little special aid in 
education. Yet they, too, have justifiable claims to recognize their cultural heritage 
in the teaching of world history and literature, for example. Democratic education 
undermines the ideal of civic equality if it conveys to students that only citizens of 
their society are deserving of equal respect and fair treatment. The more 
interrelated and interdependent democratic societies are in the world, the more 
important the full range of multicultural contributions becomes in democratic 
education. In all these examples, the aim is to educate all children as far as feasible 
to equal citizenship. 
Civic equality and individual freedom, I have shown, are both defensible and 
desirable aims of publicly funded education. Part of the responsibility of a 
democratic society to ensure the adequate education of all citizens consists of 
providing political opportunities in which citizens who identify with diverse groups 
can deliberate democratically about their differences. Democratic education 
responds to these contextual challenges of multicultural groups within a society, 
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and to diverse multicultural societies, by supporting democratic deliberation within 
societies, among other important matters, about how public schooling can best 
educate all children as civic equals. 
Multicultural conditions, as we have seen, can challenge the very aim of 
educating children for civic equality. Democracies are variously multicultural, and 
the varieties of groups make a difference in the kind of education and the progress 
toward civic equality that can realistically be expected at any time. When groups 
deny the value of civic equality, democracies cannot simply deny their 
responsibility to further civic equality for children of these groups. The interests of 
children must be considered, which is yet another reason any settlement with 
insular or separatist groups should be assessed on democratic grounds that aim to 
treat all individuals as civic equals. Democratic education is committed not to 
tolerating but to opposing educational programs that perpetuate civic inequality or 
intolerance. 
Unity and diversity in multicultural education, therefore, go together, not like 
love and marriage, since democracies are not happy or unhappy families; they are 
far more diverse than most families. Unity and diversity in education go together 
like citizens and democracies. Toleration and recognition of diversity—within 
principled limits—make democratic unity possible. Disagreements about the limits 
of diversity fuel creative and destructive tensions within the unity. The more the 
creative tensions overwhelm the destructive ones, the better off a democracy will 
be and the more constructive work democratic educators will have cut out for them.  
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